Difference between revisions of "A Is A"
From Critiques Of Libertarianism
(Created page with "<!-- you can have any number of categories here --> Category:Libertarian Propaganda Terms Category:Objectivism {{DES | des = Also known as the law of identity, is a wo...") |
|||
Line 2: | Line 2: | ||
[[Category:Libertarian Propaganda Terms]] | [[Category:Libertarian Propaganda Terms]] | ||
[[Category:Objectivism]] | [[Category:Objectivism]] | ||
+ | [[Category:Fallacies Of Philosophy]] | ||
+ | [[Category:Failures Of Libertarian Philosophy]] | ||
{{DES | des = Also known as the law of identity, is a worthless piece of philosophical drivel that plainly doesn't apply to the real world and seems to be unnecessary in mathematics. Objectivists use it as a [[shibboleth]]. | show=}} | {{DES | des = Also known as the law of identity, is a worthless piece of philosophical drivel that plainly doesn't apply to the real world and seems to be unnecessary in mathematics. Objectivists use it as a [[shibboleth]]. | show=}} | ||
<!-- insert wiki page text here --> | <!-- insert wiki page text here --> | ||
Line 9: | Line 11: | ||
The modern formulation of identity is that of Gottfried Leibniz, who held that x is the same as y if and only if every predicate true of x is true of y as well. [Cribbed from wikipedia.] This makes it pretty obvious that A's at different times are not identical if only because there is a "time at" predicate. | The modern formulation of identity is that of Gottfried Leibniz, who held that x is the same as y if and only if every predicate true of x is true of y as well. [Cribbed from wikipedia.] This makes it pretty obvious that A's at different times are not identical if only because there is a "time at" predicate. | ||
+ | |||
+ | Another major problem is that we never know "A": we only have our own views and concepts of an aspect of A, as in the story of the [[Blind men and an elephant]]. Thus, use of "A is A" would have to be restricted to a precise aspect of A, rather than A itself which is fundamentally unknowable. | ||
Ludwig Wittgenstein writes (Tractatus 5.5301): "That identity is not a relation between objects is obvious." At 5.5303 he elaborates: "Roughly speaking: to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing." [Cribbed from wikipedia.] | Ludwig Wittgenstein writes (Tractatus 5.5301): "That identity is not a relation between objects is obvious." At 5.5303 he elaborates: "Roughly speaking: to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing." [Cribbed from wikipedia.] |