Difference between revisions of "A Is A"
From Critiques Of Libertarianism
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The modern formulation of identity is that of Gottfried Leibniz, who held that x is the same as y if and only if every predicate true of x is true of y as well. [Cribbed from wikipedia.] This makes it pretty obvious that A's at different times are not identical if only because there is a "time at" predicate. | The modern formulation of identity is that of Gottfried Leibniz, who held that x is the same as y if and only if every predicate true of x is true of y as well. [Cribbed from wikipedia.] This makes it pretty obvious that A's at different times are not identical if only because there is a "time at" predicate. | ||
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| + | Another major problem is that we never know "A": we only have our own views and concepts of an aspect of A, as in the story of the [[Blind men and an elephant]]. Thus, use of "A is A" would have to be restricted to a precise aspect of A, rather than A itself which is fundamentally unknowable. | ||
Ludwig Wittgenstein writes (Tractatus 5.5301): "That identity is not a relation between objects is obvious." At 5.5303 he elaborates: "Roughly speaking: to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing." [Cribbed from wikipedia.] | Ludwig Wittgenstein writes (Tractatus 5.5301): "That identity is not a relation between objects is obvious." At 5.5303 he elaborates: "Roughly speaking: to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing." [Cribbed from wikipedia.] | ||
