Difference between revisions of "A Positive Model Of Rights"
From Critiques Of Libertarianism
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:"Thomas (R) claims a right of chattel (T) for slave labor (B<sub>R</sub>) from Dred (B) who has to tolerate the loss of his labor (O<sub>D</sub>) because if he attempts to escape or resists, he will be hunted down or punished (P<sub>D</sub>) by privately hired (F<sub>E</sub>) slave hunters or overseers (E) who expect to profit over their expenses (C<sub>E</sub>)." | :"Thomas (R) claims a right of chattel (T) for slave labor (B<sub>R</sub>) from Dred (B) who has to tolerate the loss of his labor (O<sub>D</sub>) because if he attempts to escape or resists, he will be hunted down or punished (P<sub>D</sub>) by privately hired (F<sub>E</sub>) slave hunters or overseers (E) who expect to profit over their expenses (C<sub>E</sub>)." | ||
| − | Arguably, the examples can be simpler than this model: for example when a RightHolder is his own Enforcer or the DutyBearer is also the Thing (as in the case of Dred), but that may not make the model more explanatory and may make it more difficult to compare to alternative uses of this model.<includeonly> | + | Arguably, the examples can be simpler than this model: for example when a RightHolder is his own Enforcer or the DutyBearer is also the Thing (as in the case of Dred), but that may not make the model more explanatory and may make it more difficult to compare to alternative uses of this model. The fees in this model show possible sources of income for enforcement: some of them might be zero. This model might need more complexity or be used multiple times to handle heterogeneous DutyBearers, such as slaves and abolitionists.<includeonly> |
For more explanation of this model and how it applies to economics, see: | For more explanation of this model and how it applies to economics, see: | ||
