Difference between revisions of "A Positive Model Of Rights"
From Critiques Of Libertarianism
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! Group<br><span style="color:blue">(blue circles)</span> | ! Group<br><span style="color:blue">(blue circles)</span> | ||
| − | ! Claims<br><span style="color:gray">(gray arrows)</span> | + | ! Claims<br><span style="color:gray">(gray dashed arrows)</span> |
! Income (black arrows) or<br>{{Red|Costs (red arrows)}} | ! Income (black arrows) or<br>{{Red|Costs (red arrows)}} | ||
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* F<sub>E</sub>=F<sub>R</sub>+F<sub>D</sub>+F<sub>T</sub>, <br>'''Fees''' from '''RightHolder''', '''DutyBearers''' and '''Thing''' | * F<sub>E</sub>=F<sub>R</sub>+F<sub>D</sub>+F<sub>T</sub>, <br>'''Fees''' from '''RightHolder''', '''DutyBearers''' and '''Thing''' | ||
| − | * C<sub>E</sub>, '''{{Red|Costs}}'''of enforcement from '''DutyBearers''' | + | * C<sub>E</sub>, '''{{Red|Costs}}''' of enforcement from '''DutyBearers''' |
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! DutyBearers | ! DutyBearers | ||
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:A "right" is of the form "'''RightHolder''' (R) claims a right to control a '''Thing''' (T), receiving '''Benefits''' (B<sub>R</sub>); creating a reciprocal obligation (or duty) for '''DutyBearers''' (D) to permit this despite incurring '''Opportunity Costs''' (O<sub>D</sub>) because of threatened '''Penalties''' (P<sub>D</sub>) produced at a '''Cost''' (C<sub>E</sub>) by an '''Enforcer''' (E) paid '''Fees''' (F<sub>E</sub>)". | :A "right" is of the form "'''RightHolder''' (R) claims a right to control a '''Thing''' (T), receiving '''Benefits''' (B<sub>R</sub>); creating a reciprocal obligation (or duty) for '''DutyBearers''' (D) to permit this despite incurring '''Opportunity Costs''' (O<sub>D</sub>) because of threatened '''Penalties''' (P<sub>D</sub>) produced at a '''Cost''' (C<sub>E</sub>) by an '''Enforcer''' (E) paid '''Fees''' (F<sub>E</sub>)". | ||
| − | + | '''Benefits''' (B<sub>R</sub>), '''Opportunity Costs''' (O<sub>D</sub>), '''Penalties''' (P<sub>D</sub>), '''Cost''' (C<sub>E</sub>) and '''Fees''' (F<sub>E</sub>) are all assumed to be values | |
| − | + | that are fungible in some manner. That doesn't require the form of modern markets: indeed, tit-for-tat and other strategies that work with a simpler form of fungibility can serve to exchange life, labor, time, or other values. These values will differ in the cases where DutyBearers cooperate (thus having high cooperating Opportunity Costs (O<sub>Dc</sub>) with low cooperating Penalties (P<sub>Dc</sub>)) versus where DutyBearers defect (thus having low defecting Opportunity Costs (O<sub>Dd</sub>) with high defecting Penalties (P<sub>Dd</sub>)). | |
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| − | : | + | |
Arguably, the examples can be simpler than this model: for example when a RightHolder is his own Enforcer or the DutyBearer is also the Thing (as in the case of Dred), but that may not make the model more explanatory and may make it more difficult to compare to alternative uses of this model. The fees in this model show possible sources of income for enforcement: some of them might be zero. This model might need more complexity or be used multiple times to handle heterogeneous DutyBearers, such as slaves and abolitionists.<includeonly> | Arguably, the examples can be simpler than this model: for example when a RightHolder is his own Enforcer or the DutyBearer is also the Thing (as in the case of Dred), but that may not make the model more explanatory and may make it more difficult to compare to alternative uses of this model. The fees in this model show possible sources of income for enforcement: some of them might be zero. This model might need more complexity or be used multiple times to handle heterogeneous DutyBearers, such as slaves and abolitionists.<includeonly> | ||
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* [[A Positive Model Of Rights]]</includeonly></onlyinclude> | * [[A Positive Model Of Rights]]</includeonly></onlyinclude> | ||
== The Model's Economics == | == The Model's Economics == | ||
| + | Rights will tend to be claimed (not necessarily enforced) when: | ||
| + | : B<sub>R</sub> > F<sub>R</sub> (Benefit to RightHolder is greater than Fees paid by RightHolder) | ||
| + | Rights will tend to be created (meaning enforced) when additionally: | ||
| + | : P<sub>D</sub> > O<sub>D</sub> (Penalties to DutyBearers are greater than Opportunity Costs to DutyBearers) and | ||
| + | : F<sub>E</sub> > C<sub>E</sub> (Fees for Enforcers are greater than Costs of enforcement) | ||
| + | |||
varying the assumptions of how costs and benefits are borne to | varying the assumptions of how costs and benefits are borne to | ||
== Anthropology Of The Model == | == Anthropology Of The Model == | ||
== Examples That Could Be Explained By This Model == | == Examples That Could Be Explained By This Model == | ||
| + | For example, | ||
| + | :"Joe (R) claims a right to farm on his property (T) for commercial sales (B<sub>R</sub>), and neighbor Fred (D) has to tolerate the odors, noise, traffic, etc. (O<sub>D</sub>) because if he interferes he will be fined (P<sub>D</sub>) in a civil lawsuit (C<sub>E</sub>) brought by Joe in a court (E) paid for by taxes (F<sub>E</sub>)." | ||
| + | |||
| + | For example, | ||
| + | :"Thomas (R) claims a right of chattel (T) for slave labor (B<sub>R</sub>) from Dred (B) who has to tolerate the loss of his labor (O<sub>D</sub>) because if he attempts to escape or resists, he will be hunted down or punished (P<sub>D</sub>) by privately hired (F<sub>E</sub>) slave hunters or overseers (E) who expect to profit over their expenses (C<sub>E</sub>)." | ||
| + | |||
== Extensions Of The Model == | == Extensions Of The Model == | ||
== Adaptations Of The Model == | == Adaptations Of The Model == | ||
