Difference between revisions of "A Positive Model Of Rights"
From Critiques Of Libertarianism
| Line 43: | Line 43: | ||
'''Benefits''' (B<sub>R</sub>), '''Opportunity Costs''' (O<sub>D</sub>), '''Penalties''' (P<sub>D</sub>), '''Cost''' (C<sub>E</sub>) and '''Fees''' (F<sub>E</sub>) are all assumed to be values | '''Benefits''' (B<sub>R</sub>), '''Opportunity Costs''' (O<sub>D</sub>), '''Penalties''' (P<sub>D</sub>), '''Cost''' (C<sub>E</sub>) and '''Fees''' (F<sub>E</sub>) are all assumed to be values | ||
| − | that are fungible in some manner. That doesn't require the form of modern markets: indeed, tit-for-tat and other strategies that work with a simpler form of fungibility can serve to exchange life, labor, time, or other values. These values will differ in the cases where DutyBearers cooperate (thus having high cooperating Opportunity Costs (O<sub>Dc</sub>) with low cooperating Penalties (P<sub>Dc</sub>)) versus where DutyBearers defect (thus having low defecting Opportunity Costs (O<sub>Dd</sub>) with high defecting Penalties (P<sub>Dd</sub>)). | + | that are fungible in some manner. That doesn't require the form of modern markets: indeed, tit-for-tat and other strategies that work with a simpler form of fungibility can serve to exchange life, labor, time, or other values. These values will differ in the cases where DutyBearers '''cooperate''' (thus having high cooperating Opportunity Costs (O<sub>Dc</sub>) with low cooperating Penalties (P<sub>Dc</sub>)) versus where DutyBearers '''defect''' (thus having low defecting Opportunity Costs (O<sub>Dd</sub>) with high defecting Penalties (P<sub>Dd</sub>)). |
Arguably, the examples can be simpler than this model: for example when a RightHolder is his own Enforcer or the DutyBearer is also the Thing (as in the case of Dred), but that may not make the model more explanatory and may make it more difficult to compare to alternative uses of this model. The fees in this model show possible sources of income for enforcement: some of them might be zero. This model might need more complexity or be used multiple times to handle heterogeneous DutyBearers, such as slaves and abolitionists.<includeonly> | Arguably, the examples can be simpler than this model: for example when a RightHolder is his own Enforcer or the DutyBearer is also the Thing (as in the case of Dred), but that may not make the model more explanatory and may make it more difficult to compare to alternative uses of this model. The fees in this model show possible sources of income for enforcement: some of them might be zero. This model might need more complexity or be used multiple times to handle heterogeneous DutyBearers, such as slaves and abolitionists.<includeonly> | ||
| Line 51: | Line 51: | ||
== The Model's Economics == | == The Model's Economics == | ||
A would-be RightHolder has no disincentives from making endless rights claims that can conflict with everybody else's claims until he has to pay Fees to an Enforcer. The RightHolder would be willing to pay Fees to Enforcers as long as they are less than his Benefit: | A would-be RightHolder has no disincentives from making endless rights claims that can conflict with everybody else's claims until he has to pay Fees to an Enforcer. The RightHolder would be willing to pay Fees to Enforcers as long as they are less than his Benefit: | ||
| − | : B<sub>Rc</sub> > F<sub>Rc</sub> (Benefit to RightHolder is greater than Fees paid by RightHolder when DutyBearer cooperates) and | + | : B<sub>Rc</sub> > F<sub>Rc</sub> (Benefit to RightHolder is greater than Fees paid by RightHolder when DutyBearer '''cooperates''') and |
| − | : B<sub>Rd</sub> > F<sub>Rd</sub> (Benefit to RightHolder is greater than Fees paid by RightHolder when DutyBearer defects) | + | : B<sub>Rd</sub> > F<sub>Rd</sub> (Benefit to RightHolder is greater than Fees paid by RightHolder when DutyBearer '''defects''') |
A DutyBearer receives only costs: Opportunity Costs because he cannot use the thing, Penalties if he defects from the claim, and perhaps Fees assessed by the Enforcer. For a right to work in this model, the DutyBearer would be coerced to cooperate with a rights claim when: | A DutyBearer receives only costs: Opportunity Costs because he cannot use the thing, Penalties if he defects from the claim, and perhaps Fees assessed by the Enforcer. For a right to work in this model, the DutyBearer would be coerced to cooperate with a rights claim when: | ||
| Line 58: | Line 58: | ||
An Enforcer would be willing to assess Penalties when Fees are greater than Costs: | An Enforcer would be willing to assess Penalties when Fees are greater than Costs: | ||
| − | : F<sub>Ec</sub> > C<sub>Ec</sub> (Fees to Enforcer are greater than Costs of enforcement when DutyBearer cooperates) | + | : F<sub>Ec</sub> > C<sub>Ec</sub> (Fees to Enforcer are greater than Costs of enforcement when DutyBearer '''cooperates''') |
| − | : F<sub>Ed</sub> > C<sub>Ed</sub> (Fees to Enforcer are greater than Costs of enforcement when DutyBearer defects) | + | : F<sub>Ed</sub> > C<sub>Ed</sub> (Fees to Enforcer are greater than Costs of enforcement when DutyBearer '''defects''') |
