Difference between revisions of "A Positive Model Of Rights"
From Critiques Of Libertarianism
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* [[A Positive Model Of Rights]]</includeonly></onlyinclude> | * [[A Positive Model Of Rights]]</includeonly></onlyinclude> | ||
== The Model's Economics == | == The Model's Economics == | ||
| − | A would-be RightHolder has no disincentives from making endless rights claims that can conflict with everybody else's claims until he has to pay Fees to an Enforcer. The RightHolder would be willing to pay Fees to Enforcers as long as they are less than his Benefit: | + | A would-be RightHolder has no disincentives from making endless rights claims that can conflict with everybody else's claims until he has to pay Fees to an Enforcer. The RightHolder would be willing to pay Fees to Enforcers as long as they are less than his Benefit on '''average''': |
| − | : B<sub> | + | : B<sub>Ra</sub> > F<sub>Ra</sub> (Benefit to RightHolder is greater than Fees paid by RightHolder '''averaged''' over DutyBearer's '''cooperation''' and '''defection''') |
| − | + | ||
A DutyBearer receives only costs: Opportunity Costs because he cannot use the thing, Penalties if he defects from the claim, and perhaps Fees assessed by the Enforcer. For a right to work in this model, the DutyBearer would be coerced to cooperate with a rights claim when: | A DutyBearer receives only costs: Opportunity Costs because he cannot use the thing, Penalties if he defects from the claim, and perhaps Fees assessed by the Enforcer. For a right to work in this model, the DutyBearer would be coerced to cooperate with a rights claim when: | ||
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An Enforcer would be willing to assess Penalties when Fees are greater than Costs: | An Enforcer would be willing to assess Penalties when Fees are greater than Costs: | ||
| − | : F<sub> | + | : F<sub>Ea</sub> > C<sub>Ea</sub> (Fees to Enforcer are greater than Costs of enforcement '''averaged''' over DutyBearer's '''cooperation''' and '''defection''') |
| − | + | ||
