Difference between revisions of "A Positive Model Of Rights"

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: B<sub>Ra</sub> > F<sub>Ra</sub> (Benefit to RightHolder is greater than Fees paid by RightHolder '''averaged''' over DutyBearer's '''cooperation''' and '''defection''')
 
: B<sub>Ra</sub> > F<sub>Ra</sub> (Benefit to RightHolder is greater than Fees paid by RightHolder '''averaged''' over DutyBearer's '''cooperation''' and '''defection''')
  
A DutyBearer receives only costs: Opportunity Costs because he cannot use the thing, Penalties if he defects from the claim, and perhaps Fees assessed by the Enforcer.  For a right to work in this model, the DutyBearer would be coerced to cooperate with a rights claim when:
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A DutyBearer has a choice of cooperating or defecting.  If he '''cooperates''', he bears Opportunity Costs because he cannot use the Thing and perhaps Fees assessed by the Enforcer.  If he '''defects''', the Opportunity Costs may change sign to become benefits because he can use the Thing, but he bears Penaties and perhaps Fees assessed by the Enforcer.  For a right to work in this model, the DutyBearer would be coerced to cooperate with a rights claim when:
: P<sub>Dc</sub> + O<sub>Dc</sub> < P<sub>Dd</sub> > O<sub>Dd</sub> (Penalties + Opportunity Costs to DutyBearers are less when cooperating than defecting)
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: O<sub>Dc</sub> + F<sub>Dc</sub> < P<sub>Dd</sub> + O<sub>Dd</sub> + F<sub>Dd</sub> (Penalties + Opportunity Costs to DutyBearers are less when cooperating than defecting)
  
 
An Enforcer would be willing to assess Penalties when Fees are greater than Costs:
 
An Enforcer would be willing to assess Penalties when Fees are greater than Costs:
 
: F<sub>Ea</sub> > C<sub>Ea</sub> (Fees to Enforcer are greater than Costs of enforcement '''averaged''' over DutyBearer's '''cooperation''' and '''defection''')
 
: F<sub>Ea</sub> > C<sub>Ea</sub> (Fees to Enforcer are greater than Costs of enforcement '''averaged''' over DutyBearer's '''cooperation''' and '''defection''')
  
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Rights are created when these three inequalities hold.  If the RightHolder inequality does not hold, the RightHolder will not want to enforce the claim.  If the Enforcer inequality does not hold, the Enforcer will not want to enforce the claim.  And if the DutyBearer inequality does not hold, the DutyBearer will be better off ignoring the claim.
  
 
varying the assumptions of how costs and benefits are borne to  
 
varying the assumptions of how costs and benefits are borne to  

Revision as of 21:17, 22 February 2014