Difference between revisions of "A Positive Model Of Rights"
From Critiques Of Libertarianism
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: O<sub>Dc</sub> + F<sub>Dc</sub> < P<sub>Dd</sub> + O<sub>Dd</sub> + F<sub>Dd</sub> (Penalties + Opportunity Costs to DutyBearers are less when cooperating than defecting) | : O<sub>Dc</sub> + F<sub>Dc</sub> < P<sub>Dd</sub> + O<sub>Dd</sub> + F<sub>Dd</sub> (Penalties + Opportunity Costs to DutyBearers are less when cooperating than defecting) | ||
| − | Rights | + | Rights can be sustained when these three inequalities hold. If the RightHolder inequality does not hold, the RightHolder will not want to enforce the claim. If the Enforcer inequality does not hold, the Enforcer will not want to enforce the claim. And if the DutyBearer inequality does not hold, the DutyBearer will be better off ignoring the claim: the enforcement will be ineffective. |
| + | |||
| + | Some modern ideas of "good" or "moral" or "economically efficient" rights also meet the constraint: | ||
| + | : B<sub>Ra</sub> - F<sub>Ea</sub> > O<sub>Da</sub> + < P<sub>Da</sub> (Benefit to RightHolder minus Fees to Enforcer is greater than Opportunity Costs plus Penalties to DutyBearers '''averaged''' over DutyBearer's '''cooperation''' and '''defection''') | ||
| + | |||
varying the assumptions of how costs and benefits are borne to | varying the assumptions of how costs and benefits are borne to | ||
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:"Thomas (R) claims a right of chattel (T) for slave labor (B<sub>R</sub>) from Dred (B) who has to tolerate the loss of his labor (O<sub>D</sub>) because if he attempts to escape or resists, he will be hunted down or punished (P<sub>D</sub>) by privately hired (F<sub>E</sub>) slave hunters or overseers (E) who expect to profit over their expenses (C<sub>E</sub>)." | :"Thomas (R) claims a right of chattel (T) for slave labor (B<sub>R</sub>) from Dred (B) who has to tolerate the loss of his labor (O<sub>D</sub>) because if he attempts to escape or resists, he will be hunted down or punished (P<sub>D</sub>) by privately hired (F<sub>E</sub>) slave hunters or overseers (E) who expect to profit over their expenses (C<sub>E</sub>)." | ||
| + | == Competition Between Alternative Rights Claims == | ||
== Extensions Of The Model == | == Extensions Of The Model == | ||
== Adaptations Of The Model == | == Adaptations Of The Model == | ||
