Difference between revisions of "A Positive Model Of Rights"
From Critiques Of Libertarianism
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== The Model's Economics == | == The Model's Economics == | ||
A would-be RightHolder has no disincentives from making endless rights claims that can conflict with everybody else's claims until he has to pay Fees to an Enforcer. The RightHolder would be willing to pay Fees to Enforcers as long as they are less than his Benefit on '''average''': | A would-be RightHolder has no disincentives from making endless rights claims that can conflict with everybody else's claims until he has to pay Fees to an Enforcer. The RightHolder would be willing to pay Fees to Enforcers as long as they are less than his Benefit on '''average''': | ||
| − | : B<sub>Ra</sub> > F<sub>Ra</sub> (Benefit to RightHolder is greater than Fees paid by RightHolder '''averaged''' over DutyBearer's '''cooperation''' and '''defection''') | + | : <big>'''B<sub>Ra</sub> > F<sub>Ra</sub>'''</big> (Benefit to RightHolder is greater than Fees paid by RightHolder '''averaged''' over DutyBearer's '''cooperation''' and '''defection''') |
An Enforcer would be willing to assess Penalties when Fees are greater than Costs: | An Enforcer would be willing to assess Penalties when Fees are greater than Costs: | ||
| − | : F<sub>Ea</sub> > C<sub>Ea</sub> (Fees to Enforcer are greater than Costs of enforcement '''averaged''' over DutyBearer's '''cooperation''' and '''defection''') | + | : <big>'''F<sub>Ea</sub> > C<sub>Ea</sub>'''</big> (Fees to Enforcer are greater than Costs of enforcement '''averaged''' over DutyBearer's '''cooperation''' and '''defection''') |
A DutyBearer has a choice of cooperating or defecting. If he '''cooperates''', he bears Opportunity Costs (because he cannot use the Thing) and perhaps Fees assessed by the Enforcer. If he '''defects''', the Opportunity Costs may change sign (to become benefits because he can use the Thing), but he bears Penalties and perhaps Fees assessed by the Enforcer. For a right to work in this model, the DutyBearer would be coerced to cooperate with a rights claim when: | A DutyBearer has a choice of cooperating or defecting. If he '''cooperates''', he bears Opportunity Costs (because he cannot use the Thing) and perhaps Fees assessed by the Enforcer. If he '''defects''', the Opportunity Costs may change sign (to become benefits because he can use the Thing), but he bears Penalties and perhaps Fees assessed by the Enforcer. For a right to work in this model, the DutyBearer would be coerced to cooperate with a rights claim when: | ||
| − | : O<sub>Dc</sub> + F<sub>Dc</sub> < P<sub>Dd</sub> + O<sub>Dd</sub> + F<sub>Dd</sub> (Penalties + Opportunity Costs to DutyBearers are less when cooperating than defecting) | + | : <big>'''O<sub>Dc</sub> + F<sub>Dc</sub> < P<sub>Dd</sub> + O<sub>Dd</sub> + F<sub>Dd</sub>'''</big> (Penalties + Opportunity Costs to DutyBearers are less when cooperating than defecting) |
Rights can be sustained when these three inequalities hold. If the RightHolder inequality does not hold, the RightHolder will not want to enforce the claim. If the Enforcer inequality does not hold, the Enforcer will not want to enforce the claim. And if the DutyBearer inequality does not hold, the DutyBearer will be better off ignoring the claim: the enforcement will be ineffective. | Rights can be sustained when these three inequalities hold. If the RightHolder inequality does not hold, the RightHolder will not want to enforce the claim. If the Enforcer inequality does not hold, the Enforcer will not want to enforce the claim. And if the DutyBearer inequality does not hold, the DutyBearer will be better off ignoring the claim: the enforcement will be ineffective. | ||
Some modern ideas of "good" or "moral" or "economically efficient" rights also meet the constraint: | Some modern ideas of "good" or "moral" or "economically efficient" rights also meet the constraint: | ||
| − | : B<sub>Ra</sub> - F<sub>Ea</sub> > O<sub>Da</sub> + < P<sub>Da</sub> (Benefit to RightHolder minus Fees to Enforcer is greater than Opportunity Costs plus Penalties to DutyBearers '''averaged''' over DutyBearer's '''cooperation''' and '''defection''') | + | : <big>'''B<sub>Ra</sub> - F<sub>Ea</sub> > O<sub>Da</sub> + < P<sub>Da</sub>'''</big> (Benefit to RightHolder minus Fees to Enforcer is greater than Opportunity Costs plus Penalties to DutyBearers '''averaged''' over DutyBearer's '''cooperation''' and '''defection''') |
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== Examples That Could Be Explained By This Model == | == Examples That Could Be Explained By This Model == | ||
=== Ordinary Land === | === Ordinary Land === | ||
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=== Differences In Rights Between Jurisdictions === | === Differences In Rights Between Jurisdictions === | ||
== Competition Between Alternative Rights Claims == | == Competition Between Alternative Rights Claims == | ||
| + | == Anthropology Of The Model == | ||
== Extensions Of The Model == | == Extensions Of The Model == | ||
== Adaptations Of The Model == | == Adaptations Of The Model == | ||
