Difference between revisions of "A Positive Model Of Rights"
From Critiques Of Libertarianism
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For more explanation of this model and how it applies to economics, see: | For more explanation of this model and how it applies to economics, see: | ||
* [[A Positive Model Of Rights]]</includeonly></onlyinclude> | * [[A Positive Model Of Rights]]</includeonly></onlyinclude> | ||
| + | == Claimed Rights Versus Enforced Rights == | ||
| + | Common usage of the term "rights" includes unenforced claims of rights. An unenforced claim of rights cannot be expected to provide any benefits, since nothing stops others from ignoring your claims. Unenforced claims of rights are worthless, because you could receive the same benefits (or none) without them. Unenforced claims of rights can multiply like angels on the head of a pin: nothing limits the scope of the claims. The claim for property in land can extend from the center of the earth to the heavens. Multiple claims of the same right (for example, territory of Antarctica) can coexist. Natural rights are claimed rights: they are unenforced. | ||
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| + | Any unenforced claims of rights can be rhetorically challenged by an infinite number of conflicting claims. All that because claims are essentially costless. Thus, rights that are only claimed can be ignored because equal or conflicting rights can be claimed. For example, rights of kings were challenged by natural rights. It cost nothing to make either set of claims. Making enforced rights from those claims was costly, and is one of the major purposes of governments. | ||
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| + | When we talk about rights, we are talking about rights we want enforced. Unenforced rights are worthless. | ||
== The Model's Economics == | == The Model's Economics == | ||
A would-be RightHolder has no disincentives from making endless rights claims that can conflict with everybody else's claims until he has to pay Fees to an Enforcer. The RightHolder would be willing to pay Fees to Enforcers as long as they are less than his Benefit on '''average''': | A would-be RightHolder has no disincentives from making endless rights claims that can conflict with everybody else's claims until he has to pay Fees to an Enforcer. The RightHolder would be willing to pay Fees to Enforcers as long as they are less than his Benefit on '''average''': | ||
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=== Differences In Rights Between Jurisdictions === | === Differences In Rights Between Jurisdictions === | ||
== Competition Between Alternative Rights Claims == | == Competition Between Alternative Rights Claims == | ||
| + | == Philosophical implications Of The Model == | ||
| + | All rights are coercive according to the standards of Robert Nozick. According to the [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/coercion/ Stanford Library of Philosophy article on Coercion]: | ||
| + | :Nozick analyzed coercion by offering a list of necessary and sufficient conditions for judging the truth of the claim that P coerces Q. Somewhat simplified, he argued that P coerces Q if and only if: | ||
| + | |||
| + | # P aims to keep Q from choosing to perform action A; | ||
| + | # P communicates a claim to Q; | ||
| + | # P's claim indicates that if Q performs A, then P will bring about some consequence that would make Q's A-ing less desirable to Q than Q's not A-ing; | ||
| + | # P's claim is credible to Q; | ||
| + | # Q does not do A; | ||
| + | # Part of Q's reason for not doing A is to lessen the likelihood that P will bring about the consequence announced in (3) | ||
| + | :(Nozick 1969, 441–445).[5] | ||
| + | |||
| + | This model fulfills all of Nozick's stringent requirements for coercion, and of course meets older, weaker definitions of coercion as well. | ||
== Anthropology Of The Model == | == Anthropology Of The Model == | ||
== Extensions Of The Model == | == Extensions Of The Model == | ||
== Adaptations Of The Model == | == Adaptations Of The Model == | ||
