Difference between revisions of "A Positive Model Of Rights"
From Critiques Of Libertarianism
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[[Image:Rights.jpg|500px]] | [[Image:Rights.jpg|500px]] | ||
| + | * The claims are communications between the '''RightHolder''', '''Enforcer''' and '''DutyBearers'''. | ||
| + | * The costs, benefits, fees and penalties are all utilities. If measured in some fungible units such as dollars, they permit useful modeling. | ||
* Ronnie receives the '''Benefits''' of the Thing: the tangerines. | * Ronnie receives the '''Benefits''' of the Thing: the tangerines. | ||
| − | * Eddie receives the '''Fees''' for enforcement | + | * Eddie receives the '''Fees''' for enforcement. Fees could come from any of the '''RightHolder''', the '''Thing''' or the '''DutyBearers'''. |
* The denizens of Dallas have an '''Opportunity Cost''': if it wasn't for Eddie, they could have the tangerines. | * The denizens of Dallas have an '''Opportunity Cost''': if it wasn't for Eddie, they could have the tangerines. | ||
* If the denizens of Dallas don't obey Eddie, Eddie has an enforcement '''Cost'''. | * If the denizens of Dallas don't obey Eddie, Eddie has an enforcement '''Cost'''. | ||
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* '''Enforcement Claim''' to '''Enforcer''' | * '''Enforcement Claim''' to '''Enforcer''' | ||
| | | | ||
| − | * B | + | * B, '''Benefits''' from '''Thing''' |
| − | * F<sub>R</sub>, '''{{Red|Fees}}''' to '''Enforcer''' | + | * F<sub>R</sub>, '''{{Red|Fees}}''' to '''Enforcer''' (negative for '''RightHolder''', positive for '''Enforcer''') |
|- | |- | ||
! Enforcer | ! Enforcer | ||
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* '''Threat Claim''' to '''DutyBearers''' | * '''Threat Claim''' to '''DutyBearers''' | ||
| | | | ||
| − | * F | + | * F=F<sub>R</sub>+F<sub>D</sub>+F<sub>T</sub>, <br>'''Fees''' from '''RightHolder''', '''DutyBearers''' and '''Thing''' |
| − | * C | + | * C, '''{{Red|Costs}}''' of enforcement from '''DutyBearers''' (negative for '''Enforcer) |
|- | |- | ||
! DutyBearers | ! DutyBearers | ||
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* no claims | * no claims | ||
| | | | ||
| − | * P | + | * P, '''{{Red|Penalties}}''' from '''Enforcer''' (negative for '''DutyBearers''') |
| − | * F<sub>D</sub>, '''{{Red|Fees}}''' to '''Enforcer''' | + | * F<sub>D</sub>, '''{{Red|Fees}}''' to '''Enforcer''' (negative for '''DutyBearers''', positive for '''Enforcer''') |
| − | * O | + | * O, '''{{Red|Opportunity Costs}}''' from '''Thing''' (negative for '''DutyBearers''') |
|} | |} | ||
In English prose: | In English prose: | ||
| − | :A "right" is of the form "'''RightHolder''' (R) claims a right to control a '''Thing''' (T), receiving '''Benefits''' (B | + | :A "right" is of the form "'''RightHolder''' (R) claims a right to control a '''Thing''' (T), receiving '''Benefits''' (B); creating a reciprocal obligation (or duty) for '''DutyBearers''' (D) to permit this despite incurring '''Opportunity Costs''' (O) because of threatened '''Penalties''' (P) produced at a '''Cost''' (C) by an '''Enforcer''' (E) paid '''Fees''' (F)". |
| − | '''Benefits''' (B | + | '''Benefits''' (B), '''Opportunity Costs''' (O), '''Penalties''' (P), '''Cost''' (C) and '''Fees''' (F) are all assumed to be values |
| − | that are fungible in some manner. That doesn't require the form of modern markets: indeed, tit-for-tat and other strategies that work with a simpler form of fungibility can serve to exchange life, labor, time, or other values. These values will differ in the cases where DutyBearers '''cooperate''' (thus having high cooperating Opportunity Costs (O<sub> | + | that are fungible in some manner. That doesn't require the form of modern markets: indeed, tit-for-tat and other strategies that work with a simpler form of fungibility can serve to exchange life, labor, time, or other values. These values will differ in the cases where DutyBearers '''cooperate''' (thus having high cooperating Opportunity Costs (O<sub>c</sub>) with low cooperating Penalties (P<sub>c</sub>)) versus where DutyBearers '''defect''' (thus having low defecting Opportunity Costs (O<sub>d</sub>) with high defecting Penalties (P<sub>d</sub>)). |
| − | Arguably, the examples can be simpler than this model: for example when a RightHolder is his own Enforcer or the DutyBearer is also the Thing (as in the case of | + | Arguably, the examples can be simpler than this model: for example when a RightHolder is his own Enforcer or the DutyBearer is also the Thing (as in the case of a slaveowner), but that may not make the model more explanatory and may make it more difficult to compare to alternative uses of this model. The fees in this model show possible sources of income for enforcement: some of them might be zero. This model might need more complexity or be used multiple times to handle heterogeneous DutyBearers, such as slaves and abolitionists.<includeonly> |
For more explanation of this model and how it applies to economics, see: | For more explanation of this model and how it applies to economics, see: | ||
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{{QuoteOne|Anarchical Fallacies/Nonsense on stilts}} | {{QuoteOne|Anarchical Fallacies/Nonsense on stilts}} | ||
When we talk about rights, we are talking about rights we want enforced. Unenforced rights are worthless. | When we talk about rights, we are talking about rights we want enforced. Unenforced rights are worthless. | ||
| + | |||
== The Model's Economics == | == The Model's Economics == | ||
| − | A would-be RightHolder has no disincentives from making endless rights claims that can conflict with everybody else's claims until he has to pay Fees to an Enforcer. The RightHolder would be willing to pay Fees to Enforcers as long as they are less than his Benefit on '''average''': | + | A would-be RightHolder has no disincentives from making endless rights claims that can conflict with everybody else's claims until he has to pay Fees to an Enforcer. The RightHolder would be willing to pay Fees to Enforcers as long as they are less than his Benefit on '''average''' (or perhaps on the '''margin'''): |
| − | : <big>'''B | + | : <big>'''B > F<sub>R</sub>'''</big> (Benefit to RightHolder is greater than Fees paid by RightHolder '''averaged''' over DutyBearer's '''cooperation''' and '''defection''') |
An Enforcer would be willing to assess Penalties when Fees are greater than Costs: | An Enforcer would be willing to assess Penalties when Fees are greater than Costs: | ||
| − | : <big>'''F<sub> | + | : <big>'''F<sub>E</sub> > C'''</big> (Fees to Enforcer are greater than Costs of enforcement '''averaged''' over DutyBearer's '''cooperation''' and '''defection''') |
A DutyBearer has a choice of cooperating or defecting. If he '''cooperates''', he bears Opportunity Costs (because he cannot use the Thing) and perhaps Fees assessed by the Enforcer. If he '''defects''', the Opportunity Costs may change sign (to become benefits because he can use the Thing), but he bears Penalties and perhaps Fees assessed by the Enforcer. For a right to work in this model, the DutyBearer would be coerced to cooperate with a rights claim when: | A DutyBearer has a choice of cooperating or defecting. If he '''cooperates''', he bears Opportunity Costs (because he cannot use the Thing) and perhaps Fees assessed by the Enforcer. If he '''defects''', the Opportunity Costs may change sign (to become benefits because he can use the Thing), but he bears Penalties and perhaps Fees assessed by the Enforcer. For a right to work in this model, the DutyBearer would be coerced to cooperate with a rights claim when: | ||
| − | : <big>'''O | + | : <big>'''O + F<sub>c</sub> < P<sub>d</sub> + O<sub>d</sub> + F<sub>Dd</sub>'''</big> (Penalties + Opportunity Costs to DutyBearers are less when cooperating than defecting) |
Rights can be sustained when these three inequalities hold. If the RightHolder inequality does not hold, the RightHolder will not want to enforce the claim. If the Enforcer inequality does not hold, the Enforcer will not want to enforce the claim. And if the DutyBearer inequality does not hold, the DutyBearer will be better off ignoring the claim: the enforcement will be ineffective. | Rights can be sustained when these three inequalities hold. If the RightHolder inequality does not hold, the RightHolder will not want to enforce the claim. If the Enforcer inequality does not hold, the Enforcer will not want to enforce the claim. And if the DutyBearer inequality does not hold, the DutyBearer will be better off ignoring the claim: the enforcement will be ineffective. | ||
Some modern ideas of "good" or "moral" or "economically efficient" rights also meet the constraint: | Some modern ideas of "good" or "moral" or "economically efficient" rights also meet the constraint: | ||
| − | : <big>'''B | + | : <big>'''B - F > O + P'''</big> (Benefit to RightHolder minus Fees to Enforcer is greater than Opportunity Costs plus Penalties to DutyBearers summed for DutyBearer who '''cooperate''' and '''defect''') |
| + | |||
== Examples That Could Be Explained By This Model == | == Examples That Could Be Explained By This Model == | ||
| + | |||
=== Ordinary Land === | === Ordinary Land === | ||
"Joe (R) claims a right to farm on his property (T) for commercial sales (B<sub>R</sub>), and neighbor Fred (D) has to tolerate the odors, noise, traffic, etc. (O<sub>D</sub>) because if he interferes he will be fined (P<sub>D</sub>) in a civil lawsuit (C<sub>E</sub>) brought by Joe in a court (E) paid for by taxes (F<sub>E</sub>)." | "Joe (R) claims a right to farm on his property (T) for commercial sales (B<sub>R</sub>), and neighbor Fred (D) has to tolerate the odors, noise, traffic, etc. (O<sub>D</sub>) because if he interferes he will be fined (P<sub>D</sub>) in a civil lawsuit (C<sub>E</sub>) brought by Joe in a court (E) paid for by taxes (F<sub>E</sub>)." | ||
| + | |||
=== Slavery === | === Slavery === | ||
"Thomas (R) claims a right of chattel (T) for slave labor (B<sub>R</sub>) from Dred (D) who has to tolerate the loss of his labor (O<sub>D</sub>) because if he attempts to escape or resists, he will be hunted down or punished (P<sub>D</sub>) by privately hired (F<sub>E</sub>) slave hunters or overseers (E) who expect to profit over their expenses (C<sub>E</sub>)." | "Thomas (R) claims a right of chattel (T) for slave labor (B<sub>R</sub>) from Dred (D) who has to tolerate the loss of his labor (O<sub>D</sub>) because if he attempts to escape or resists, he will be hunted down or punished (P<sub>D</sub>) by privately hired (F<sub>E</sub>) slave hunters or overseers (E) who expect to profit over their expenses (C<sub>E</sub>)." | ||
| + | |||
=== Commons Without Scarcity === | === Commons Without Scarcity === | ||
| + | |||
=== Role Of The State === | === Role Of The State === | ||
| + | |||
=== Differences In Rights Between Jurisdictions === | === Differences In Rights Between Jurisdictions === | ||
| + | |||
== Competition Between Alternative Rights Claims == | == Competition Between Alternative Rights Claims == | ||
| + | |||
== Philosophical implications Of The Model == | == Philosophical implications Of The Model == | ||
All rights are coercive according to the standards of Robert Nozick. According to the [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/coercion/ Stanford Library of Philosophy article on Coercion]: | All rights are coercive according to the standards of Robert Nozick. According to the [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/coercion/ Stanford Library of Philosophy article on Coercion]: | ||
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This model fulfills all of Nozick's stringent requirements for coercion, and of course meets older, weaker definitions of coercion as well. | This model fulfills all of Nozick's stringent requirements for coercion, and of course meets older, weaker definitions of coercion as well. | ||
| + | |||
== Anthropology Of The Model == | == Anthropology Of The Model == | ||
| + | |||
== Extensions Of The Model == | == Extensions Of The Model == | ||
| + | For now, to keep the model simple, a number of costs are not made explicit. The cost of extracting benefits to the RightHolder is presumed to reduce Benefits, and is included therein. The cost of extracting benefits for the DutyBearer when defecting is presumed to reduce the negated Opportunity Costs, and is included therein. The cost of making the various Claims are considered negligable and thus omitted. | ||
| + | |||
| + | All the economic benefits and costs can be considered marginal. Adding marginality can help model the extent of the right claims. For example, diminishing marginal benefit might explain why it is impractical to enforce claims perfectly. Alternatively, some claims might have increasing marginal benefit due to network externalities, as in phone systems. In territorial property, average enforcement costs would decrease as territory expands to natural boundaries such as coasts, rivers, mountains, deserts, etc. | ||
| + | |||
== Adaptations Of The Model == | == Adaptations Of The Model == | ||
| + | |||
==Related Articles== | ==Related Articles== | ||
* [[What Are Rights?]] | * [[What Are Rights?]] | ||
