Difference between revisions of "A Positive Model Of Rights"
From Critiques Of Libertarianism
| Line 46: | Line 46: | ||
* '''Threat Claim''' to '''DutyBearers''' | * '''Threat Claim''' to '''DutyBearers''' | ||
| | | | ||
| − | * F=F<sub>R</sub>+F<sub>D</sub>+F<sub>T</sub>, | + | * F=F<sub>R</sub>+F<sub>D</sub>+F<sub>T</sub>, '''Fees''' from '''RightHolder''', '''DutyBearers''' and '''Thing''' |
* C, '''{{Red|Costs}}''' of enforcement from '''DutyBearers''' (negative for '''Enforcer) | * C, '''{{Red|Costs}}''' of enforcement from '''DutyBearers''' (negative for '''Enforcer) | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 63: | Line 63: | ||
'''Benefits''' (B), '''Opportunity Costs''' (O), '''Penalties''' (P), '''Cost''' (C) and '''Fees''' (F) are all assumed to be values | '''Benefits''' (B), '''Opportunity Costs''' (O), '''Penalties''' (P), '''Cost''' (C) and '''Fees''' (F) are all assumed to be values | ||
| − | that are fungible in some manner. That doesn't require the form of modern markets: indeed, tit-for-tat and other strategies that work with a simpler form of fungibility can serve to exchange life, labor, time, or other values. These values will differ in the cases where DutyBearers '''cooperate''' (thus having | + | that are fungible in some manner. That doesn't require the form of modern markets: indeed, tit-for-tat and other strategies that work with a simpler form of fungibility can serve to exchange life, labor, time, or other values. These values will differ in the cases where DutyBearers '''cooperate''' (thus having Opportunity Costs (O<sub>c</sub>) whose values are negative to the DutyBearers and low cooperating Penalties (P<sub>c</sub>)) versus where DutyBearers '''defect''' (thus having Opportunity Costs (O<sub>d</sub>) whose values are positive to the DutyBearers and high defecting Penalties (P<sub>d</sub>)). |
Arguably, the examples can be simpler than this model: for example when a RightHolder is his own Enforcer or the DutyBearer is also the Thing (as in the case of a slaveowner), but that may not make the model more explanatory and may make it more difficult to compare to alternative uses of this model. The fees in this model show possible sources of income for enforcement: some of them might be zero. This model might need more complexity or be used multiple times to handle heterogeneous DutyBearers, such as slaves and abolitionists.<includeonly> | Arguably, the examples can be simpler than this model: for example when a RightHolder is his own Enforcer or the DutyBearer is also the Thing (as in the case of a slaveowner), but that may not make the model more explanatory and may make it more difficult to compare to alternative uses of this model. The fees in this model show possible sources of income for enforcement: some of them might be zero. This model might need more complexity or be used multiple times to handle heterogeneous DutyBearers, such as slaves and abolitionists.<includeonly> | ||
| Line 86: | Line 86: | ||
A DutyBearer has a choice of cooperating or defecting. If he '''cooperates''', he bears Opportunity Costs (because he cannot use the Thing) and perhaps Fees assessed by the Enforcer. If he '''defects''', the Opportunity Costs may change sign (to become benefits because he can use the Thing), but he bears Penalties and perhaps Fees assessed by the Enforcer. For a right to work in this model, the DutyBearer would be coerced to cooperate with a rights claim when: | A DutyBearer has a choice of cooperating or defecting. If he '''cooperates''', he bears Opportunity Costs (because he cannot use the Thing) and perhaps Fees assessed by the Enforcer. If he '''defects''', the Opportunity Costs may change sign (to become benefits because he can use the Thing), but he bears Penalties and perhaps Fees assessed by the Enforcer. For a right to work in this model, the DutyBearer would be coerced to cooperate with a rights claim when: | ||
| − | : <big>'''O + F<sub>c</sub> < P<sub>d</sub> + O<sub>d</sub> + F<sub>Dd</sub>'''</big> (Penalties + Opportunity Costs to DutyBearers are less when cooperating than defecting) | + | : <big>'''O<sub>c</sub> + F<sub>c</sub> < P<sub>d</sub> + O<sub>d</sub> + F<sub>Dd</sub>'''</big> (Penalties + Opportunity Costs to DutyBearers are less when cooperating than defecting) |
Rights can be sustained when these three inequalities hold. If the RightHolder inequality does not hold, the RightHolder will not want to enforce the claim. If the Enforcer inequality does not hold, the Enforcer will not want to enforce the claim. And if the DutyBearer inequality does not hold, the DutyBearer will be better off ignoring the claim: the enforcement will be ineffective. | Rights can be sustained when these three inequalities hold. If the RightHolder inequality does not hold, the RightHolder will not want to enforce the claim. If the Enforcer inequality does not hold, the Enforcer will not want to enforce the claim. And if the DutyBearer inequality does not hold, the DutyBearer will be better off ignoring the claim: the enforcement will be ineffective. | ||
