Difference between revisions of "A Positive Model Of Rights"
From Critiques Of Libertarianism
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! Opportunity Costs | ! Opportunity Costs | ||
! Penalties | ! Penalties | ||
| − | ! Fees | + | ! Fees (F<sub>D</sub>) |
|- | |- | ||
! Cooperate | ! Cooperate | ||
| Line 104: | Line 104: | ||
A DutyBearer has a choice of cooperating or defecting. If he '''cooperates''', he bears Opportunity Costs (because he cannot use the Thing) and perhaps Fees assessed by the Enforcer. If he '''defects''', the Opportunity Costs may change sign (to become benefits because he can use the Thing), but he bears Penalties and perhaps Fees assessed by the Enforcer. For a right to work in this model, the DutyBearer would be coerced to cooperate with a rights claim when: | A DutyBearer has a choice of cooperating or defecting. If he '''cooperates''', he bears Opportunity Costs (because he cannot use the Thing) and perhaps Fees assessed by the Enforcer. If he '''defects''', the Opportunity Costs may change sign (to become benefits because he can use the Thing), but he bears Penalties and perhaps Fees assessed by the Enforcer. For a right to work in this model, the DutyBearer would be coerced to cooperate with a rights claim when: | ||
| − | : <big>'''O<sub>c</sub> + F<sub>c</sub> < P<sub>d</sub> + O<sub>d</sub> + F<sub>Dd</sub>'''</big> (Penalties + Opportunity Costs to DutyBearers are less when cooperating than defecting) | + | : <big>''' P<sub>c</sub> + O<sub>c</sub> + F<sub>c</sub> < P<sub>d</sub> + O<sub>d</sub> + F<sub>Dd</sub>'''</big> (Penalties + Opportunity Costs to DutyBearers are less when cooperating than defecting) |
Rights can be sustained when these three inequalities hold. If the RightHolder inequality does not hold, the RightHolder will not want to enforce the claim. If the Enforcer inequality does not hold, the Enforcer will not want to enforce the claim. And if the DutyBearer inequality does not hold, the DutyBearer will be better off ignoring the claim: the enforcement will be ineffective. | Rights can be sustained when these three inequalities hold. If the RightHolder inequality does not hold, the RightHolder will not want to enforce the claim. If the Enforcer inequality does not hold, the Enforcer will not want to enforce the claim. And if the DutyBearer inequality does not hold, the DutyBearer will be better off ignoring the claim: the enforcement will be ineffective. | ||
