Difference between revisions of "A Positive Model Of Rights"
From Critiques Of Libertarianism
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An Enforcer would be willing to assess Penalties when Fees are greater than Costs: | An Enforcer would be willing to assess Penalties when Fees are greater than Costs: | ||
: <big>'''F<sub>E</sub> > C'''</big> (Fees to Enforcer are greater than Costs of enforcement '''averaged''' over DutyBearer's '''cooperation''' and '''defection''') | : <big>'''F<sub>E</sub> > C'''</big> (Fees to Enforcer are greater than Costs of enforcement '''averaged''' over DutyBearer's '''cooperation''' and '''defection''') | ||
| + | Costs are presumed to include detection of defectors and administration of penalties. | ||
A DutyBearer has a choice of cooperating or defecting. If he '''cooperates''', he bears Opportunity Costs (because he cannot use the Thing) and perhaps Fees assessed by the Enforcer. If he '''defects''', the Opportunity Costs may change sign (to become benefits because he can use the Thing), but he bears Penalties and perhaps Fees assessed by the Enforcer. For a right to work in this model, the DutyBearer would be coerced to cooperate with a rights claim when: | A DutyBearer has a choice of cooperating or defecting. If he '''cooperates''', he bears Opportunity Costs (because he cannot use the Thing) and perhaps Fees assessed by the Enforcer. If he '''defects''', the Opportunity Costs may change sign (to become benefits because he can use the Thing), but he bears Penalties and perhaps Fees assessed by the Enforcer. For a right to work in this model, the DutyBearer would be coerced to cooperate with a rights claim when: | ||
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== Extensions Of The Model == | == Extensions Of The Model == | ||
For now, to keep the model simple, a number of costs are not made explicit. The cost of extracting benefits to the RightHolder is presumed to reduce Benefits, and is included therein. The cost of extracting benefits for the DutyBearer when defecting is presumed to reduce the negated Opportunity Costs, and is included therein. The cost of making the various Claims are considered negligable and thus omitted. | For now, to keep the model simple, a number of costs are not made explicit. The cost of extracting benefits to the RightHolder is presumed to reduce Benefits, and is included therein. The cost of extracting benefits for the DutyBearer when defecting is presumed to reduce the negated Opportunity Costs, and is included therein. The cost of making the various Claims are considered negligable and thus omitted. | ||
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| + | A useful extension would be to divide the DutyBearers into four groups, the combinations of cooperating/defecting and known/unknown to enforcer. Defecting groups would be receiving benefits from the thing. Known cooperators could have little or no penalties or fees, and could even have rewards for cooperation (though this might be unlikely because it could be expensive to reward many cooperators.) | ||
All the economic benefits and costs can be considered marginal. Adding marginality can help model the extent of the right claims. For example, diminishing marginal benefit might explain why it is impractical to enforce claims perfectly. Alternatively, some claims might have increasing marginal benefit due to network externalities, as in phone systems. In territorial property, average enforcement costs would decrease as territory expands to natural boundaries such as coasts, rivers, mountains, deserts, etc. | All the economic benefits and costs can be considered marginal. Adding marginality can help model the extent of the right claims. For example, diminishing marginal benefit might explain why it is impractical to enforce claims perfectly. Alternatively, some claims might have increasing marginal benefit due to network externalities, as in phone systems. In territorial property, average enforcement costs would decrease as territory expands to natural boundaries such as coasts, rivers, mountains, deserts, etc. | ||
