Difference between revisions of "A Positive Model Of Rights"

Ronnie claims the right to pick tangerines from a tree and pays Eddie to enforce that right against the denizens of Dallas.  Eddie tells them "you have a duty to let Ronnie pick the tangerines because Ronnie has the right and I will pop anybody who does."

* The denizens of Dallas are '''DutyBearers''': a duty to let Ronnie pick the tangerines is forced on them by Eddie, otherwise by preventing Ronnie from picking, they could have more tangerines for themselves.

* The denizens of Dallas have an '''Opportunity Cost''': if it wasn't for Eddie, they could have more tangerines.

* F=F_R+F_D+F_T, '''Fees''' from '''RightHolder''', '''DutyBearers''' and '''Thing'''

:A "right" is of the form "'''RightHolder''' (R) claims a right to control a '''Thing''' (T), receiving '''Benefits''' (B); with a correlate obligation (or duty) for '''DutyBearers''' (D) to permit this despite incurring '''Opportunity Costs''' (O) because of threatened '''Penalties''' (P) produced at a '''Cost''' (C) by an '''Enforcer''' (E) paid '''Fees''' (F)".

that are fungible in some manner.  That doesn't require the form of modern markets: indeed, tit-for-tat and other strategies that work with a simpler form of fungibility can serve to exchange life, labor, time, or other values.  These values will differ in the cases where DutyBearers '''cooperate''' versus where DutyBearers '''defect''':

 

 

Arguably, the examples can be simpler than this model: for example when a RightHolder is his own Enforcer or the DutyBearer is also the Thing (as in the case of a slaveowner), but that may not make the model more explanatory and may make it more difficult to compare to alternative uses of this model.  The fees in this model show possible sources of income for enforcement: some of them might be zero.  This model might need more complexity or be used multiple times to handle heterogeneous DutyBearers, such as slaves and abolitionists. [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/#2.1 In addition, this is the atomic form of a right: rights usually come in molecular groupings to form complex rights.]<includeonly>

: <big>''' P_c + O_c + F_c < P_d + O_d + F_Dd'''</big> (Penalties + Opportunity Costs to DutyBearers are less when cooperating than defecting)

For now, to keep the model simple, a number of costs are not made explicit.  The cost of extracting benefits to the RightHolder is presumed to reduce Benefits, and is included therein. The cost of extracting benefits for the DutyBearer when defecting  is presumed to reduce the negated Opportunity Costs, and is included therein.  The cost of making the various Claims are considered negligable and thus omitted.  Investment in the Thing to increase benefits (a major feature of property and some other rights) is also included in Benefits.

 

A useful extension would be to divide the DutyBearers into four groups, the combinations of cooperating/defecting and known/unknown to enforcer.  Defecting groups would be receiving benefits from the thing.  Known cooperators could have little or no penalties or fees, and could even have rewards for cooperation (though this might be unlikely because it could be expensive to reward many cooperators.)  This has the minor drawback of making the diagram of the model more complex.

All the economic benefits and costs could be considered marginal.  Adding marginality can help model the extent of the right claims.  For example, diminishing marginal benefit might explain why it is impractical to enforce claims perfectly.  Alternatively, some claims might have increasing marginal benefit due to network externalities, as in phone systems.  In territorial property, average enforcement costs would decrease as territory expands to natural boundaries such as coasts, rivers, mountains, deserts, etc.