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<!-- you can have any number of categories here --> [[Category:Unlearning Economics]] [[Category:Actual Human Rationality]] [[Category:Homo economicus]] [[Category:Nudge]] {{Quote | text = Another example is the case of [[Nudge]]. The central point of this book is that people’s decisions are always pushed in a certain direction, either by advertising and packaging, by what the easiest or default choice is, by the way the choice is framed, or any number of other things. This completely destroys the idea of ‘free to choose’ – if people’s choices are rarely or never made neutrally, then one cannot be said to be ‘deciding for them’ any more than the choice was already ‘decided’ for them. The best conclusion is to push their choices in a ‘good’ direction (e.g. towards healthy food rather than junk). Nudging people isn’t a decision – they are almost always nudged. The question is the direction they are nudged in. | cite = [[Unlearning Economics]], "{{Link |Economic Decision Making and Libertarianism}}" }}
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