Difference between revisions of "Libertarians Misunderstand Coercion"
From Critiques Of Libertarianism
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Coercion is one of the basic abilities of ordinary humans. Two others are production and reproduction. | Coercion is one of the basic abilities of ordinary humans. Two others are production and reproduction. | ||
| − | Coercion is one solution to almost any collective action problem, and in a large subset of them everyone would prefer to be coerced than to have autonomy | + | Coercion of everyone is one solution to almost any [[collective action problem]], and in a large subset of them everyone would prefer to be coerced rather than to have autonomy because other potential solutions are not working. |
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If a problem is worse than the coercion needed to solve it (even after non-coercive attempts at solutions), coercion is the logical choice. Even minimalist government libertarians come to this conclusion, requiring coercion to provide for defense. | If a problem is worse than the coercion needed to solve it (even after non-coercive attempts at solutions), coercion is the logical choice. Even minimalist government libertarians come to this conclusion, requiring coercion to provide for defense. | ||
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because most "unable" really means that you haven't the money to bribe your | because most "unable" really means that you haven't the money to bribe your | ||
way past the coercive protections of property. (freedom as absence of | way past the coercive protections of property. (freedom as absence of | ||
| − | restrictions | + | restrictions is not present in a market society, where all useful material |
and situations tend to be property, and you must bribe your way past coercion.) | and situations tend to be property, and you must bribe your way past coercion.) | ||
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Most libertarians reject this as not being specific enough to be limited to person and property. | Most libertarians reject this as not being specific enough to be limited to person and property. | ||
| − | Nozick has a good definition of coercion similar to Hayek's but much more analytic. | + | Nozick has a good definition of coercion similar to Hayek's but much more analytic. Both would include non-violent shunning as coercive. |
Hayek (Const.OL p. 21) switches to ought when he has individuals creating their own private spheres. But really cannot prevent government from having rules about taxation and redistribution. He also has government mold the environment of rules in which the spontaneous order is to occur: but government is a rationalist order. | Hayek (Const.OL p. 21) switches to ought when he has individuals creating their own private spheres. But really cannot prevent government from having rules about taxation and redistribution. He also has government mold the environment of rules in which the spontaneous order is to occur: but government is a rationalist order. | ||
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| + | Markets are actually coercive solutions to [[collective action problems]]: they rely on the coercive creation of property and rights. Even simple strategies such as tit-for-tat and shunning rely on that same coercive background to protect the players. | ||
