Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit it

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Carpenter, Daniel, and David A. Moss. 2013. Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit it. Cambridge University Press.

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Description

An extraordinary academic book which surveys history, defining, measuring, and solutions to regulatory capture.

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A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture [More...]
Chapter 1 of Preventing Regulatory Capture. Conservative pessimism about regulatory capture is fostered by a myopic focus on economics. Regulation's focus is often on political, not economic, issues such as "the unprecedented influence of large corporations on politics". An excellent read.
Preventing Economists’ Capture [More...]
Chapter 6 of Preventing Regulatory Capture. The same standard economic incentives that drive regulatory capture should also result in capture of economists by business interests. Economists seem unwilling to admit they have the same problem.

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