Difference between revisions of "What Is Property?"
From Critiques Of Libertarianism
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==What about the Lockean Proviso?== | ==What about the Lockean Proviso?== | ||
| − | Locke declared that making property was just when "leaving enough and as good for everyone else." There is a very simple measure of when this proviso is violated: whenever a price arises for any undeveloped property. That would make pretty much all property in land unjust now. A small sect of libertarians, the geolibertarians, criticize other libertarians on this | + | Locke declared that making property was just when "leaving enough and as good for everyone else." There is a very simple measure of when this proviso is violated: whenever a price arises for any undeveloped property. That would make pretty much all property in land unjust now. A small sect of libertarians, the geolibertarians, criticize other libertarians on this basis. See: {{Link| A Geolibertarian FAQ}}. |
Robert Nozick excuses this injustice by declaring "it is ok to rob them of their access because capitalism is so great that they will be better off for having been robbed." (A paraphrase by Matt Bruenig.) Bruenig writes: "This solution leads to a whole host of problems, the most glaring of which is that it seems to undermine one of the key points of libertarianism. If you can violently destroy people’s liberty so long as you leave them better off, then surely a long variety of things that libertarians hate can be justified, e.g. banning large sodas. There is no reason welfare-improving paternalism should be limited just to the initial appropriation of property, though Nozick clearly would like it to be so limited." See: {{Link|The Nozickian case for Rawls’ difference principle}}. | Robert Nozick excuses this injustice by declaring "it is ok to rob them of their access because capitalism is so great that they will be better off for having been robbed." (A paraphrase by Matt Bruenig.) Bruenig writes: "This solution leads to a whole host of problems, the most glaring of which is that it seems to undermine one of the key points of libertarianism. If you can violently destroy people’s liberty so long as you leave them better off, then surely a long variety of things that libertarians hate can be justified, e.g. banning large sodas. There is no reason welfare-improving paternalism should be limited just to the initial appropriation of property, though Nozick clearly would like it to be so limited." See: {{Link|The Nozickian case for Rawls’ difference principle}}. | ||
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==Are there different rights for public property?== | ==Are there different rights for public property?== | ||
| − | In Elinor Ostrom's article [[Efficiency, Sustainability, and Access Under Alternative Property-Rights Regimes | + | In Elinor Ostrom's article [[Efficiency, Sustainability, and Access Under Alternative Property-Rights Regimes]], she identifies five property rights that are most relevant |
for the use of common-pool resources, including access, withdrawal, management, | for the use of common-pool resources, including access, withdrawal, management, | ||
exclusion, and alienation. These are defined as: | exclusion, and alienation. These are defined as: | ||
