View source for Once more into the breach of self-ownership: Reply to Narveson and Brenkert

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[[Category:G. A. Cohen]]
[[Category:Jan Narveson]]
[[Category:Self-Ownership]]
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{{DES | des = [[G. A. Cohen]] shreds [[Jan Narveson]]'s arguments about self-ownership, defending his own arguments in [[Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality]]. | show=}}
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{{Quotations|Once more into the breach of self-ownership: Reply to Narveson and Brenkert|quotes=true}}

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In reply to Narveson, I distinguish his no-proviso argument from his liberty argument, and I show that both fail. I also argue that interference lacks the strategic status he assigns to it, because it cannot be appropriately distinguished, conceptually and morally, from prevention; that natural resources do enjoy the importance he denies they have; that laissez-faire economies lack the superiority he attributes to them; that ownership can indeed be a reflexive relation; that anti-paternalism does not entail libertarianism; and that he misrepresents the doctrines of a number of philosophers, including John Locke, Ronald Dworkin, and myself. In reply to Brenkert, I show that he seriously misconstrues my view of the nature of freedom, and of its relationship to self-ownership. I then refute his criticisms of my treatment of the contrasts between self-ownership, on the one hand, and autonomy and non-slavery, on the other. I also show that his attempt to exorcize the demon of self-ownership is multiply flawed.
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